Wayzata World Factbook 1996/The World Factbook - 1996 Edition - Wayzata Technology (3079) (1996).iso/pc/text/humanrts/sudan.txt

Text File | 1996-01-05 | 29KB | 570 lines

TITLE:  SUDAN HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, 1994
AUTHOR:  U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DATE:  FEBRUARY 1995

                             SUDAN


After the 1989 coup that overthrew Sudan's democratically
elected government, the military assumed power under Lt.
General Omar Hassan al-Bashir and his National Salvation
Revolution Command Council (RCC).  Bashir and the RCC suspended
the 1985 Constitution, abrogated press freedoms, and banned all
political parties and trade unions.  In 1993 the RCC dissolved
itself and appointed Lt. General Bashir President.  However,
since 1989 real power has rested with Hassan al-Turabi and his
National Islamic Front (NIF).  NIF control over government
operations was further solidified with the end of the RCC, and
NIF members and supporters held most key positions in the
Government, security forces, judiciary, academia, and the
media.  The NIF continued to consolidate its power in 1994.
Although legislative authority theoretically rests with the
government-appointed Transitional National Assembly (TNA), the
new Government maintained the RCC's suspension of the 1985
Constitution and continued to restrict most civil liberties.

The civil war in Sudan continued, despite efforts by Kenya,
Uganda, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Sudan, under the auspices of the
Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD),
to seek a peaceful solution to the conflict.  Government forces
launched a major offensive against the Sudanese People's
Liberation Army (SPLA), gaining some ground, displacing
thousands of civilians, and causing new outflows of refugees.

In the second half of the year, however, the SPLA took the
offensive, overrunning Amadi, besieging Kapoeta, and attacking
other government-held positions.  By year's end, the Government
had suffered heavy casualties, its hold on Kapoeta had become
precarious, and it had been forced, because of SPLA pressure,
to postpone its planned dry-season offensive.  Despite SPLA
successes, divisions between the SPLA (mainstream faction), led
by John Garang, and the South Sudan Independence Movement
(SSIM), formerly the United faction of the SPLA, led by Riak
Machar, continued to hamper the insurgency's effectiveness in
battling the Government.

In addition to the regular police and Sudan People's Armed
Forces (SPAF), the Government maintains an Islamic militia, the
Popular Defense Forces (PDF), and an Islamic police force, the
Popular Police, whose mission includes enforcing proper social
behavior, including restrictions on alcohol and "immodest
dress."

Civil war, economic mismanagement, high inflation, over 2.5
million internally displaced persons, and a refugee influx from
neighboring countries have devastated Sudan's mostly
agricultural economy.  Exports of gum arabic, livestock, and
meat accounted for over 50 percent of Sudan's 1994 export
earnings.  Reforms aimed at privatizing state-run firms and
stimulating private investment have failed to revive a moribund
economy saddled with massive military expenditures.

The dismal human rights situation showed no improvement in
1994.  Both the Government and insurgents committed serious
human rights abuses, including massacres and extrajudicial
killing, kidnaping, and forced conscription.  A myriad of
official and secret government security forces routinely
harassed, detained, and tortured opponents or suspected
opponents of the Government with impunity.  Despite some
improvement in overall cooperation with U.N.-sponsored relief
operations, both the SPAF/PDF and SPLA/SSIM periodically
obstructed the flow of humanitarian assistance to affected
populations.

The Government and rebels continued to restrict most civil
rights, including the rights to free speech and association.
In the context of the Islamization and Arabization drive,
pressure--including forced Islamization--on non-Muslims
remained strong.  Fears of Arabization and Islamization and the
imposition of Shari'a (Islamic law) have fueled support for the
southern insurgency.  Serious abuses against women and children
continued.

RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1  Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
           Freedom from:

     a.  Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing

Official and unofficial government forces committed an
undetermined number of political killings of persons suspected
of belonging to or collaborating with the insurgent SPLA.
There were also credible reports that government forces
executed over 20 Chadian dissidents in western Sudan in January
and killed at least 3 students while putting down an
antigovernment riot in El Obeid in February.

There are credible reports that security forces beat and
tortured to death detainees.  For example, police beat to death
Mustafa Azraq, a street vendor, who had been in police custody
in Khartoum for less than 24 hours.  Similarly, in September
security forces tortured to death opposition activist Abdel
Meneim Rahma in Wad Medani.  The Government routinely denied
any wrongdoing and has yet to discipline publicly any official
guilty of political or extrajudicial killing since it came to
power in 1989.

In an incident highlighting intra-Islamic divisions, in
February gunmen linked to al Muslimin, a small extremist
Islamic sect, murdered 16 worshipers and wounded over 20 more
at a mosque in Omdurman because they had "betrayed" Islam.  The
attackers also allegedly planned to kill leading Saudi Islamist
Bin Laden and NIF leader Hassan al-Turabi.  Police killed two
of the gunmen following a shoot-out, and captured a third,
along with an accomplice who did not participate in the
shootings.  Their trial, conducted by a special court presided
over by a government-appointed judge linked to the National
Islamic Front, lasted from July to September.  Credible
government sources conducting the pretrial investigation
complained that the Government was suppressing evidence,
downplaying, in particular, the gunmen's ties to senior members
of the Government and the NIF.  In September the court
sentenced the surviving gunman to death and his accomplice to
10 years in prison.  The death sentence was carried out
immediately.

There were also credible reports that both the SPLA and SSIM
carried out egregious political and extrajudicial killings and
massacred civilians during combat operations.  In October the
SSIA (the armed wing of the SSIM) was responsible for the
massacre of more than 100 residents in the town of Akot, many
of whom were killed in their beds at the Akot hospital.  The
Akot massacre was part of the endemic fighting between the
rival southern insurgent movements (SPLA/Mainstream and the
SSIM).

     b.  Disappearance

The Government was responsible for continued arrests and
subsequent disappearances of persons suspected of supporting
the rebels in government-controlled areas in the South and Nuba
Mountains.  Scores of persons arrested by government forces in
Juba in 1992, including two local U.S. Agency for International
Development employees, Dominic Morris and Chaplain Lako,
remained unaccounted for, and most are believed dead.  However,
there were reliable reports that at least a few of those
arrested then were being held in a Khartoum prison; the
Government has stated it has no knowledge of their whereabouts.

     c.  Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
         Treatment or Punishment

The Government's official and unofficial security forces
continued routinely to beat and torture suspected opponents.
In May security personnel arrested and badly beat elderly
southern politician Eliaba Surur for having contacts with the
U.S. Embassy.  He later required brain surgery to remove a
blood clot, suffered as a result of his beating.  Security
forces arrested and beat scores of students after antiregime
demonstrations in El Obeid and Wad Medani in February and
April.  Eyewitnesses in Wad Medani reported that the police had
deliberately broken limbs of some of the arrested student
demonstrators.  During the January trial of a group accused of
conspiring to commit sabotage (see Section 1.e.), the
defendants stated that they had been brutally tortured.  Court-
appointed medical examiners confirmed that at least seven had
been tortured; some had been badly burned.

Throughout the year the security forces detained government
opponents incommunicado, often for months, in unofficial
prisons known as "ghost houses."  Some inmates released in 1994
commented that conditions had improved compared to previous
years.  However, inmates in ghost houses were still subject to
torture, including whipping and clubbing; suspension by the
wrists; application of electric shocks; burning with hot irons;
submersion in hot and cold water; deprivation of food, water,
sleep, and access to toilet facilities; confinement in
overcrowded and unsanitary quarters; deprivation of medical
care; and psychological torture.

There were, however, fewer reports of torture in ghost houses
in 1994 than in previous years.  The Government has never
publicly disciplined any security official for torture,
although its use is widely known.

There were credible and recurrent reports that both government
and insurgent forces in the field periodically raped women and
that police personnel sometimes raped female detainees.  There
were also credible reports that SPLA and SSIM forces tortured
some of their prisoners.

Conditions in official prisons were harsh but generally not
life-threatening.  Almost all prisons were built before
independence in 1956 and are poorly maintained.  Many lack
basic facilities like toilets or showers.  Health care is
primitive and food inadequate.  Minors are often held with
adults.  Female prisoners are kept separately from men, and
rape in prison (as opposed to police stations) does not appear
to be a major problem.

Sudan's 1991 Criminal Act, based on the Shari'a, mandates
specific "hudud" punishments, including amputation, stoning,
and lashing, for some offenses.  The courts handed down several
sentences involving amputations in 1994, of which at least one
was carried out.  The Government routinely meted out lashings,
most often to persons convicted of brewing or consuming
alcohol, following trials that did not meet internationally
accepted standards of fairness (see Section 1.e.).  In July the
authorities lashed Abdoullahi Yusif and his brother Mohanna
Mohammed of Wad Medani for alleged apostasy; Mohanna had to be
hospitalized as a result.

     d.  Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile

The 1991 Criminal Code does not include provisions concerning
the length of detention of security and other detainees, and
the Government routinely detained persons without charge and
without reference to the judiciary.  The state of emergency
introduced following the 1989 coup authorizes the Government to
arrest people without using warrants and to detain them
indefinitely without charge or trial.  Under the National
Security Act, the Government may detain a suspect for
interrogation for up to 72 hours.  This is renewable for up to
1 month with "justification," which is not defined.

Also under the 1992 National Security Act, the President has
the power to authorize "precautionary detention" for up to 3
months "to preserve the general security," but in practice this
authority rests with subordinate officials.  A person detained
under this provision theoretically must be notified of the
reasons for detention within these 3 months, and the President
may extend detention for 3 more months if a magistrate approves
the extension.  In practice, these legal provisions are
routinely ignored as the authorities often detain opponents in
ghost houses indefinitely.

The law allows for bail, except for those accused of crimes
punishable by death or life imprisonment.  In theory, the
Government provides legal counsel for indigents in the case of
crimes punishable by death or life imprisonment.  However,
courts sometimes fail to inform defendants of this right.
Moreover, in some cases counsel is only allowed to advise the
defendant and may not address the court.  Thus, despite some
legal protections, detainees have few rights and are often
subject to arbitrary, and in many cases, incommunicado
detention.

The Government's secrecy and arbitrary detention practices made
it impossible to know the exact number of political detainees
and prisoners.  Although the Government continued to pick up
and detain suspected opponents across the country, the number
of new arrests decreased compared to previous years.

After brief detentions in April 1993 and April 1994 in which he
was questioned about his opposition activities, Sadiq al Mahdi
was again arrested and held for 12 days.  The Government
alleged that al Mahdi and his two supporters, Hamad Bagadi and
Abdul Rahman Farah, were involved in a conspiracy to overthrow
the Government that included assassinations and bombings.
Although both al Mahdi and Bagadi made statements upon their
release admitting that Bagadi had passed information to a
foreign intelligence service, the Government never pressed
formal charges against any of the three. It released Bagadi and
Farah in early July.  The authorities detained Sid'Ahmed
Hussein without charge on two occasions in 1994.  In November
1993, they arrested Hussein and held him in a ghost house until
February 1994.  In mid-April, they rearrested him and released
him in late May.

The authorities picked up numerous other lower ranking
opposition figures and others throughout the year and held some
for several months.  Reasonable estimates of the number of
political detainees ranged between several score and a few
hundred.  The Government also continued its practice of de
facto arrest of suspected opponents by requiring them to report
to security offices in the morning and wait all day for several
days in a row.  Those targeted for such harassment were unable
to earn a livelihood.

     e.  Denial of Fair Public Trial

The judiciary is not independent and is largely subservient to
the Government.  The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court,
formerly elected by sitting judges, is now appointed (as the
senior judge in the Sudanese judicial service, he also controls
the judiciary).  Since 1989 the authorities have replaced
hundreds of judges considered ideologically unsuitable.  Most
new judges have ties to the NIF and favor strict application of
Islamic law (the Shari'a); many have little or no legal
training.  The RCC banned the respected Sudanese Bar
Association in 1989 and replaced it with a government-appointed
committee.  Human rights monitors have pointed out that the
Government continued to harass, detain, and torture members of
the legal profession it views as political opponents.

Sudan's judicial system includes four types of courts:  regular
courts, both criminal and civil; special mixed security courts;
military courts; and tribal courts in rural areas to resolve
disputes over land and water rights and family matters.  The
1991 Criminal Act governs criminal cases, whereas the 1983
Civil Transactions Act still applies to most civil cases.
Military trials, whose proceedings are secret and brief, do not
meet international standards.

Trials in the regular courts nominally meet international
standards of legal protections.  For instance, the accused
normally have the right to counsel, and the courts should
provide free legal counsel for indigent defendants accused of
crimes punishable by death or life imprisonment.  In practice,
however, these legal protections are unevenly applied.

In 1989 the Special Courts Act created special three-person
security courts to deal with a wide range of offenses,
including violations of constitutional decrees, emergency
regulations, and some sections of the Penal Code, as well as
drug and currency offenses.  Special courts, on which both
military and civilian judges sit, handle most security related
cases.  Attorneys may advise defendants as "friends of the
court" but normally may not address the court.  Lawyers
complain that they are sometimes granted access to court
documents too late to prepare an effective defense.  Sentences
are usually severe and implemented at once.  Death sentences,
however, are referred to the Chief Justice and the Head of
State.  Defendants may file appeal briefs with the Chief
Justice.

In a case with political undertones, the trial of 2 suspects
charged with killing 16 persons at Omdurman's Thawara Mosque
began in July.  The majority of the victims were members of the
pro-Saudi branch of the Ansar el Sunna sect which is opposed to
the NIF.  Opposition figures charge that the Government or NIF
organized the massacre, and their assertions were fueled by the
appointment of a judge closely linked to the NIF to preside
over the case.  In September the court sentenced the surviving
gunman to death and his accomplice to 10 years in prison.  The
death sentence was carried out immediately.

In April, despite the court's acknowledgment that confessions
were elicited through the use of torture, the court found
guilty 21 of 29 defendants accused of plotting bombings and
sentenced them to prison terms ranging from 2 to 10 years.  The
court found the confessions admissible evidence because the
defendants could not prove they were actually being tortured at
the time they confessed (see Section 1.c.).  The court also
claimed that Islamic law allows torture, despite the bulk of
Islamic jurisprudence to dispute this assertion.

In late 1994, the authorities released half a dozen former
officers who had been sentenced for alleged coup plotting in
1990 and 1991.

The Government officially exempts the 10 southern states, whose
population is mostly non-Muslim, from parts of the 1991
Criminal Act.  But the Act permits the possible future
application of Shari'a in the south, if the local state
assemblies, envisioned in Sudan's new political system, so
decide.  Moreover, in 1993 the Government transferred all
non-Muslim judges from the south to the north, replacing them
with Muslim judges.  However, there were no reports that hudud
punishments, other than lashings, were carried out by the
courts in government-controlled areas of the south.  Fear of
the imposition of Shari'a remained a key issue in the rebellion.

Parts of the south and the Nuba mountains fell outside of
effective judicial procedures and other governmental
functions.  According to credible reports, government units
summarily tried and punished those accused of crimes,
especially offenses against civil order.  In SPLA-held areas,
there was some reliance on traditional justice by village
elders.  However, the SPLA ultimately ruled by summary methods,
including beatings, torture, and arbitrary execution.

     f.  Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
         Correspondence

The Government routinely interferes with its citizens'
privacy.  Throughout 1994 security forces frequently conducted
night searches without warrants.  They targeted persons
suspected of political crimes or also, in northern Sudan, of
distilling or consuming illegal alcoholic beverages.  For
example, in March security forces broke up a family ceremony in
a private home in memory of 28 officers executed in 1991 for
coup plotting.  They arrested and beat 30 participants at the
memorial service.

A wide network of government informants conducted pervasive
surveillance in schools, universities, markets, workplaces, and
neighborhoods.  The authorities kept key opposition figures
under frequent surveillance.  The Government also continued its
practice of summarily dismissing military personnel and other
government employees whose loyalty it suspected.  Dozens lost
their jobs throughout the year.  Security personnel routinely
opened and read mail and tapped telephones.

Government-instituted neighborhood "popular committees,"
ostensibly a mechanism for political mobilization, served as a
means for monitoring households.  These committees caused many
Sudanese to be wary of neighbors who could report them for
"suspicious" activities, including "excessive" contact with
foreigners.  The committees also furnished or withheld
documents essential for obtaining an exit visa from Sudan.  In
high schools, students were sometimes pressured to join
proregime youth groups.

     g.  Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian
         Law in Internal Conflicts

Since the civil war began in 1983, at least 1.5 million people
have been killed as the result of fighting between the Islamic
Government in the north and insurgents in southern Sudan.  The
civil war continued unabated in 1994, and all sides involved in
the fighting were responsible for abuses in violation of
humanitarian norms.  At year's end, the Government controlled
most of Sudan, except for parts of the south and the Nuba
Mountains.  All efforts undertaken by Sudan's neighbors (Kenya,
Uganda, Ethiopia, and Eritrea) to seek a peaceful resolution to
the civil war under the auspices of IGADD were unsuccessful
(see Section 3).

Government forces launched a major offensive against the SPLA,
gaining some ground, displacing thousands of civilians, and
causing new outflows of refugees.  However, Government forces
suffered heavy casualties and were put on the defensive late in
the year when the SPLA took the offensive.  SPAF units bombed
civilian targets indiscriminately, forcing thousands of
southern Sudanese to flee to neighboring Uganda and Kenya.
Government forces were also responsible for the massacre of
civilians, and throughout the year PDF forces regularly looted
and burned villages and killed civilians in "pacification" and
other military operations, particularly around Aweil, Warrap,
Thiet, and Tonj.

By year's end the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) access to war-wounded had improved, but the evacuation
of wounded from certain localities in the south continued to be
subject to authorization which was not systematically granted.
The former Chief of Security in Kordofan Province, Khalid Abd
El Karim Salih, told the Arabic-language London-based
periodical Al-Majallah in March that government forces
systematically targeted civilian populations in the Nuba
Mountains, killing thousands.

The SPLA and SSIM were also responsible for egregious abuses
and attacks on civilians, exemplified by the massacre of more
than 100 residents of the southern town of Akot by SSIA forces
in October (see Section 1.a.).  Approximately 300 members of
the armed wing of the SSIM entered Akot on October 24 and
killed and wounded town residents, including several patients
at the Akot hospital who were killed in their beds.  Several
thousand families fled Akot following the incident.

In October police killed at least five people and wounded
dozens of others at the Khuddeir Squatters Settlement in
Omdurman when the Government forcibly resettled its residents
and demolished the slum (see Section 2.d.).

Section 2  Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

     a.  Freedom of Speech and Press

The Government severely curtails freedom of speech and press.
Government intimidation and surveillance, fostered in part by
the informer network, continued to inhibit open, public
discussion of political issues.  Radio, television, and the
bulk of the print media are controlled entirely by the
Government and required to reflect government and NIF
policies.  Sudan television had a permanent military censor to
ensure that the news reflected government views.

In mid-1993, the Government adopted a new Press Code that
called for turning the existing state-owned print media into
publicly held companies.  The Code also allowed the formation
of new, private newspapers.  Implementation of the Code has
been slow.  The few publications that issued shares were
purchased by government ministries and state-owned
corporations, thus keeping them under government control.

In 1994 two privately owned dailies began publishing in
accordance with the new Code.  After several months of
harassment, in April the Government shut down permanently the
Sudan al-Duwali, published by NIF supporter Mahjoub Irwa.
Articles in the Sudan al-Duwali had been critical of government
actions, including corruption, prompting the Government to
accuse the paper of circulating false information and serving
"foreign circles and countries."  Police also arrested and
briefly detained Majoub Irwa and two key journalists, Ahmad Al
Bagadi and Mutawakel Abd El Daafich, but did not charge the
three men with any crime.  The other newly opened, privately
owned daily, Al Ahbar Al Yaum, has followed a progovernment
line and has not encountered any problems.

The Government often charged that the international, and
particularly Western, media have an anti-Sudan bias, and it
routinely confiscated issues of foreign publications that were
judged hostile to the Government.  Although the Government
periodically granted foreign journalists entry and access to
war zones and a variety of political leaders, security forces
closely monitored their activities.  In one instance in 1994,
police briefly detained a journalist and confiscated his film.
In June the Government closed the Khartoum office of
Egyptian-published opposition newspaper Al-Khartoum and
detained in a ghost house its local correspondent, Abdul Saeed
for 3 months.  As a result of the Government's hostile
attitude, many respected journalists who worked in the local
media before 1989 have quit their jobs and left Sudan.

After the coup, the Government harassed and dismissed many
academics considered antiregime, and its practice of repressing
opposition has had a chilling effect on academic debate.
Government security forces continued to arrest and detain
academics linked with opposition parties.  The Government
continued to use political and ideological criteria in
appointing new faculty.

     b.  Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association

The authorities severely restricted these freedoms, permitting
only government-sponsored gatherings.  The declaration of the
state of emergency and of martial law on June 30, 1989,
effectively eliminated the right to assembly.  Security forces
repeatedly used excessive force in breaking up nongovernment-
sponsored demonstrations (see Section 1.a.).

Apart from a few indigenous NGO's involved in relief work and
sports and social clubs, all private associations were
controlled by the Government or the NIF.

     c.  Freedom of Religion

Although the Government has stated that all religions should be
respected and freedom of worship guaranteed, in practice the
Government treats Islam as the de facto state religion and has
declared that Islam must inspire the country's laws,
institutions, and policies.  Various restrictions under the
Missionary Societies Act of 1962 limited the ability of
non-Muslims to practice their religion freely, and the 1991
Criminal Act made apostasy by Muslims punishable by death.

There were credible reports that security forces harassed,
intimidated, and, in at least one confirmed instance,
physically abused Christian converts in 1994.  In July
authorities lashed and threatened with death Christian clan
leader Sheikh Abdoullahi Yusuf and Mohanna Mohammed for
apostasy.  In April the police arrested and detained without
charge three Catholic Church volunteers from Egypt and a
Catholic clergyman for alleged threats to the security of the
State.  In May the authorities released the Sudanese clergyman
and expelled the three Egyptians from the country at the same
time.

Authorities continued to restrict the activities of Christians
in 1994.  The law forbids proselytizing of Muslims, but Muslims
are allowed to proselytize freely.  The Government required
missionary groups to apply for special licenses, and work
permits for foreign missionaries remained difficult to obtain.
The Government continued to deny permission to build churches,
and in the north, no new churches have been built since the
early 1970's.  There were also reliable reports that in some
war zones, government forces closed churches and restricted
movements of Christian clergy.  The Sudan Catholic Bishops'
Conference (SCCB), the Sudan Council of Churches (SCC), and the
Coptic Church all faced restrictions on their activities, which
local officials often interpreted capriciously.  Among these
restrictions were the repeated difficulties experienced by
Christian clergymen in obtaining travel permits to attend
Christian Church conferences abroad.  In October the Government
announced that the Missionary Act had been abrogated and
replaced by a new law.  However, the details of the new law had
not been made public by year's end.